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Spooky Grammatical Effects
Joseph Davis

The idea in linguistics that the absence of an overt structural element
can have real consequences — that nothing can be something — may
perhaps forever and rightly be analytically suspect. But it does have a
long pedigree and a successful track record. For instance, various null
elements have been proposed in phonology, morphology, and
grammar. And, in addition to discrete null elements, there are
broader types of structural distinctions involving the absence of overt
structure. Evidence continues to support the position that structural
absence has a role to play in linguistic theory. And linguistics is far
from unique in this respect; absence plays roles in such other realms
of human experience as physics, mathematics, sport, music, and
anthropology.
Any misgivings in linguistics about the absence of substance
have august precedent. Albert Einstein’s discomfort with the idea in
quantum mechanics that measurement of a particle in one place can
have an effect on a particle in a completely different place was
famously expressed in his phrase “spooky action at a distance.” Yet
experimental evidence has long since backed up the notion of such
“entanglement” of particles. Similarly in linguistics, decades of work

have supported the position that nothingness is a force to be reckoned
with.
There is no need now, therefore, for a paper laying out a
general theoretical consideration of nullity in linguistics, and certainly
no need to justify the practical uses that have been made of various
nulls. This paper, instead, will trace a development from the very
early days of the field to the most recent developments in Columbia
School and variationist linguistics. This is the path that leads to the
work of Ricardo Otheguy and that stands to inform the work of
linguists who will continue to benefit from his influence. This path
runs from the American Descriptivist null or zero element in
phonological and morphological paradigms, through the empty
categories of later formal syntax and — contemporaneously but not
compatibly — the organization of Columbia School’s grammatical
systems, extending then to more recent work that expands Columbia
School theory and to Otheguy’s own constructive critique of variationist linguistics. In terms of forebears to Otheguy, this treatment will
touch upon, among others, Saussure, Bloomfield, Harris, Chomsky,
Diver, Labov, and García. Throughout the paper, analogies will be
made with other, nonlinguistic human behaviors, in keeping with the
view that human language, far from being modular, is instead “entirely
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consistent with the way any other form of everyday human activity is
carried out” (Diver, 1995/2012, p. 485).

1. The null in mathematics

While quantum mechanics represents human efforts to understand
physical phenomena, the null — or empty, or zero — element has
played an important role too in fields that deal with human mental
concepts. So mathematics, for instance, has its empty set. Consider
the three simple equations and the sets of solutions each has in real
numbers in Diagram 1.

Diagram 1. Null in mathematics
I

II

III

Equation:

x2 = 9

2x = 0

x2 = -1

Solutions:

{-3, +3}

{0}

{}

Size of set:

2 solutions

1 solution

0 solutions

Equation I has two solutions, -3 and +3; that is, the set of solutions to
Equation I has two members. Equation II has one solution, the real
number 0; the set of solutions to Equation II has one member.
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Equation III has no solutions on the real number line; the set of
solutions to Equation III has no members. Mathematics calls { } the
empty set. Another symbol for the same concept is Ø. Of course,
mathematics is not linguistcs, and empty sets in mathematical set
theory do not relate to sets of real numbers in the same ways that null
elements in linguistics relate to overt elements in linguistics. Still,
mathemtics does offer another realm of human experience in addition
to linguistics where a full understanding requires the postulation of a
kind of emptiness. Besides, in “Ø,” mathematics furnishes a handy
symbol for linguists to use.

2. The null in semiotics

Conceptual uses of the empty structural element include not only the
mathematical but also the semiotic. Consider first baseball and then
language.
In baseball, it is the job of the umpire to judge whether each
pitch that comes towards the batter is a good pitch or a bad pitch.
Those are the only two possibilities. A good pitch is called a strike; a
bad pitch is called a ball. A strike, or a good pitch, is a pitch that the
batter should reasonably try to hit. If the batter does not swing at a
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good pitch, the umpire calls a strike and thereby penalizes the batter’s
team. A ball, or a bad pitch, is a pitch that the batter should not be
expected to try to hit. If the batter does not swing at a bad pitch, the
umpire calls a ball and thereby penalizes the pitcher’s team. To
convey to the assembled crowd of spectators his judgement of each
pitch, the umpire employs visual signals—to use the semiotic term—
for strike and ball: To signal “strike,” the umpire visibly moves one
arm, typically extending it at an upward angle. To signal “ball,” the
umpire does nothing. See Diagram 2.

Diagram 2. Null in baseball

@@ Insert file Umpire here

“Strike!”

“Ball.”

In the closed semiotic system that is shared by the umpire, the
players, and the spectators, that absence of movement by the umpire
is significant; it conveys a meaning. Baseball uses a null element.

5

2.1 Linguistics

Linguistic theory has made extensive use of nothingness. This has
been the case even though it has long been recognized that languageusers’ pragmatic interpretation in discourse goes “beyond what
sentences actually say” (Li & Thompson, 1979, p. 312), even to the
point that, according to Ono & Thompson (1997, p. 489), if inference
in communication were properly taken into account, then the
syntactic “notion of ‘zero’” that they have in mind “would play no
role.” That is, linguistic theory under-represents the messages for
whose communication humans use language. This view (that
grammar falls short of accounting for communication) is essentially
compatible with Columbia School’s distinction between signaled
meaning and inferred message (Diver, 1974/2012, p. 31, 1975/2012,
pp. 48-54).
Nevertheless, the null in linguistics has been heavily relied
upon.
Typically, in lexicon, phonological distinctiveness is crucial for
keeping lexical items apart. So bear needs to be pronounced distinctly
from beer, if miscommunication is not to ensue. Nevertheless,
homonymy — the absence of a phonological distinction — is
commonplace in lexicon, as in “bear the burden,” “trap a bear,” and
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“bare one’s soul” — plus “the undertaker needs another bier.” As
evidenced by such speech communities as the French and the
Mandarin, the human capacity for dealing with homonymy in speech
is vast. Homonymy may well be the strongest evidence for what Diver
(1975/2012, pp. 53-56) referred to as a “human factor” in language:
the fact that human intelligence is what allows language to function as
well as it does in spite of the semiotic imperfections built into its
structure.
In orthography, a writer may use an alphabet to represent
meaningful units such as words. To that end, English orthography
typically makes use of twenty-six letters, A-Z. Omission of letters,
however, may be indicated by an apostrophe, as in isn’t (is not) or
fo’c’sle (forecastle). The apostrophe, then, is in a sense sometimes an
orthographic null element.

2.1.1 Saussure to Bloomfield to Chomsky and beyond
Linguistics has a long tradition of the use of the null element.
Saussure (1878, interpreted in Diver, 1974/2012, pp. 27-30)
proposed for historical Greek a zero alternation with /e/ and /o/ (e.g.,
leip- / loip- / lip-) to account for attested patterns of vowels in IndoEuropean languages. Bloomfield (1926), in his “Set of Postulates for
the Science of Language,” decreed: “Absence of sound may be a
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phonetic or formal alternant [§43]. . . . Such an alternant is a zero
element [§44].” Bloomfield gave empirical justification: “The
postulation of zero elements is necessary for Sanskrit . . ., for Primitive
Indo-European . . ., and probably economical for English.” For the last,
Bloomfield cited book “with affix zero, as opposed to book-s.” Here
Bloomfield was treating together “phonetic alternation,” involving
phonemes, and “formal alternation,” involving morphemes. Zero as a
phoneme was taken up by Hockett (1942, §7.8) and achieved a fairly
secure place, as phoneme or allophone, in American Descriptive
linguistics. Zero as a morpheme was enshrined by Harris (1942,
§2.1).
The null element in grammar — though certainly grammar is a
term of uncertain denotation, depending on the grammarian — rests
upon the postulation of a null element in morphology. For instance,
once the linguist, with Harris (1946), moves “From Morpheme to
Utterance,” the postulation of a zero in morphology leads inexorably
to the concept of a zero in syntax (§7.3). Thus Ø enters into formal
syntax essentially as a morpheme. For instance, in Syntactic
Structures (Chomsky, 1957, p. 39), Ø is an option alongside other
verbal affixes denoted past, S, en, and ing in a rewriting rule. Then, in
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, come the dummy element and the null
feature (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 103, 155). These last are purely formal
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elements of syntax with no phonological or morphological content.
For instance, one “dummy element” serves for “signifying” that the
rule of the passive transformation of a sentence is obligatory, and one
“null feature” specifies part of the syntactic environment for a
selectional rule involving adjectives that can describe humans or not.
The raison d’être of such constructs is to represent a syntactic
property, something to do with the structure of sentences, not with
the structure of morphemes. Likewise, the principle of “recoverability
of deletion” (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 179, 182) in transformational syntax
leads naturally to the creation of some formalism — a trace — to
preserve the element that is deleted. For instance, the adjective clever
would hypothetically have been deleted — leaving a trace — from its
application to the noun Mary in the sentence These men are more
clever than Mary. A syntactic slot, furthermore, is free to be occupied
by an empty category such as PRO in a subject slot: It is unclear what
PRO to do (Chomsky, 1982, p. 64).
Outside of the realm of formal syntax, too, the recognition of
significant absence is longstanding, even if the theoretical basis for the
recognition has remained largely unquestioned. In both the variationist and the grammaticalization frameworks — not that these are
always separate — significant absence (e.g., null, zero, or null
instantiation) is supported by some sort of structural paradigm, be it
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communicative (e.g., rhetorical), semantic (e.g., conceptual),
traditional (e.g., the paradigm of grammatical person), or still
syntactic.
Taking a feature of discourse — quotation — into account,
D’Arcy (2012), in a variationist, diachronic study of English, sees a
“null form” as a “strategy” of introducing quotation, alongside such
overt lexical material as say, think, go, and (forms of) be like, to which
list D’Arcy appends “Other.” If lexical items such as these — as
opposed to grammatical elements — are members of an “open list”
(Diver, 1990/2012, p. 69), then such a “null form,” rather than
constituting a structurally defined element as above, really amounts
to the absence of an overt form (see below) in a communicative
rhetorical context that is researcher-defined.
As regards the diachronic dimension, Bickel, WitzlackMakarevich, Zakharko & Iemmolo (2015) assume the “structure of
agreement paradigms” to frame their cross-linguistic investigation
testing a diachronic universal statistical principle involving the
development, through grammaticalization, of “zero forms in the third
rather than in the first and second person” (p. 30). Here, obviously,
the paradigm of grammatical person provides the frame in which a
zero form can be posited or assumed.
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Bybee (1994), treating “The Grammaticization of Zero,”
proposes that, through usage, something conceptual that is
identifiable only in the “universal conceptual space surrounding the
communicative context of language use” (p. 251), but not in the
linguistic system itself, can develop into a linguistic element that has
no phonetic substance but “true semantic content that is equivalent in
many ways to” other linguistic elements (p. 242).i Here, not universal
syntactic structure but “universal conceptual space” is guiding the
postulation of zero.
In a similar vein, but adding a variationist approach too, Torres
Cacoullos & Walker (2009) identify “overt indication of temporal
distance” — cf. no overt indication — as a conditioning factor in
“expression of future time in English.” Zero remains even here a
creature of hypothetical structure, semantic even if not morphological
or syntactic.
In variationist linguistics, some version of null is much studied,
but typically it is assumed as the realization of a syntactic slot, not
fundamentally proposed or questioned as a theoretical entity. For
instance, Schwenter (2006), assuming, as did Chomsky, the syntactic
framework of sentence structure, treats “null direct object” as an
“observation” that is empirically “VARIABLE” in Spanish.ii Tippets
(2011) likewise assumes a syntactic framework within which to
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identify direct objects in Spanish. Within the “envelope of variation”
of verbs that occur with “a-marked” direct objects, Tippets compares
these tokens with “un-marked or a-less tokens” (excluding other uses
of a ‘to’).iii
Subject of the sentence, too, counts as a syntactic slot. Within
variationist linguistics, the problem of “the variable absence and
presence of subject personal pronouns in Spanish” — in the careful
words of Ricardo Otheguy (2015, emphasis added jd) — has an
extensive literature. It is an apparently uncontroversial statement
that “In Spanish, as with other so-called pro-drop languages, subject
personal pronouns (SPPs) are often omitted . . . without changing the
basic meaning of the utterance” (Carvalho, Orozco, & Shin, 2015, p.
xiii). Leaving aside other theoretical obstacles (or “boulders,” to use
Otheguy’s term), the view that a subject personal pronoun is
“omitted” can ultimately be traced back, perhaps, all the way to the
pioneering variationist study of the “deletion” of copula in English by
Labov (1969). Though much that is practical — involving, say,
bilingualism, contact, and language acquisition — has been learned
through quantitative studies of the phenomenon (as seen in papers in
Carvalho, Orozco, & Shin, 2015), few are those scholars who have
questioned, as Otheguy has, whether the absence — or omission or
deletion — of a form (such as él ‘he’) is the same thing, theoretically
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speaking, as the presence of a null form ().iv As Otheguy points out,
the distinction becomes crucial when, for instance, a researcher is
concerned, on the one hand, with syntactic factors such as tense and,
on the other, with extra-sentential discourse factors such as
continuity of reference (or “switch reference”).
The theme in this intellectual history is the power of
postulated structure to compel the postulation of null elements to
prop that structure up. So if it is postulated that there exist
meaningful forms (morphemes) made up of phonological elements
(phonemes), then if these entities sometimes turn up (in alternation
or in historical development) without those phonological elements, a
null alternate of the physically absent sound will serve the purpose of
preserving the postulated morphological structure. And if it is
postulated that there exist sentences arranged in rule-governed
patterns, then if these sentences sometimes turn up without those
patterns (e.g., an infinitive clause without an overt subject), an empty
category will serve the purpose of preserving the postulated sentence
structure. Or if, instead of syntax, semantics is assumed to be
universal, then alternation between the overt and the covert can still
be deemed to have been “observed.” When such statements are made,
theory—explicit or not—is driving analysis.
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2.1.2. William Diver and the Columbia School
Not to say that analysis ever should or could be purely bottom-up or
ad-hoc. Even the iconoclast William Diver (1993/2012, 1995/2012)
— who, like Saussure before him, renounced the nomenclaturism of
syntax (Otheguy, 2002) in developing what we now know as Columbia
School linguistics and who insisted that “theory be guided by analysis,
rather than the other way around” (1995/2012, p. 445) — Even Diver
measured analytical success by the goodness of fit of his hypotheses
to the data he had chosen, and he explicitly recognized the theoretical
orientations that held the hypotheses together plausibly and
coherently. That is, some overarching consideration always justifies
the postulation of a null element. That is true both in what precedes
and in what follows.
Diver’s thought, while certainly influenced by his predecessors,
is distinct from the paradigms of formal linguistics, grammaticalization, and variationist linguistics.v

2.1.2.1. Diver and null. Diver adopted the American Descriptivist
construct of null. He discussed it in Diver (1990/2012) and
incorporated it right into his grammar, where it was a signal of a
meaning (cf. Saussure’s signifiant and signifié), for instance the
meaning ONE in the English system of Number, as in cat-Ø as opposed
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to cat-s, with –s being the signal of the opposing meaning OTHER THAN
ONE.

Thus, Diver continued the practice of positing a null element to

support the postulation of structure, in this case by using null to
complete the exhaustive categorization of the semantic substance of
Number.
This is not to say that it is always easy to decide whether or not
to posit a zero signal, but in principle the decision is guided by
oppositional structure, as long recognized (e.g., García & Putte, 1989).
Contini-Morava (2006) wrestles with the question of “The Difference
Between Zero and Nothing” in the context of a Swahili problem.
Certain Swahili noun classes, unlike most of the eleven or so noun
classes in that language, lack any identifying overt prefix in certain
morphophonemic contexts. Only one of these noun classes, according
to Contini-Morava, should be analyzed as having a zero prefix; the
others “simply lack a prefix.” This is an analytical decision, not a
given. In Contini-Morava’s words (p. 221): “a zero, or significant
absence, can be most easily recognized (and therefore can reliably
convey its meaning [in Diver’s sense of that term]) within a closed set
of oppositions in which all other alternatives are overt marks of some
kind.”
But the present paper is not a disquisition on just null; it is
instead, one might say, a broader Much Ado About Nothing. This

15

paper is an overview of the ways in which linguistic structure can be
analytically relevant even when there is no overt sign of it at a certain
point in discourse. Among those ways, zero, or the null element, is
just one; there are other ways.

2.1.2.2. Diver and homonymy in grammar. Another way for linguistic
structure to be absent but relevant, seen already here in lexicon, is
homonymy, in which a posited structural distinction is not
maintained. Diver had homonymy in grammar too. This in itself is
not unusual when one thinks of the homonymy of the English plural
noun –s mentioned just above, as in the cat-s, and the singular verb –s,
as in It meows. These hypotheses regarding the homonymy of -s in
English are developed in Reid (1991) and further in Reid (2011).
Nor is such homonymy unusual in another of Diver’s languages
of interest, Latin. There, for instance, the suffix of the nominative
plural of the first declension is identical to the suffix of the dative
singular of that declension, so agricolae could be ‘farmer-nom-pl’ or
‘farmer-dat-sg.’ (In other declensions, the nominative plural and the
dative singular are phonologically distinct.) For Diver (in Diver &
Davis, 2012, pp. 218-219), those cases were signals of meanings in a
grammatical system he called Degree of Control. Diagram 3 shows the
system in an interlock with the system of Number and illustrated with
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a lexical item of the first declension (with length indicated by colon),
with the two instances of the homonymous agricolae highlighted in
italic type:

Diagram 3. Diver’s system of Degree of Control in Latin
(simplified)
meanings

signals

illustration (ONE / OTHER)

MOST

nominative

agricola / agricolae

MORE

ablative

agricola: / agricoli:s

LESS

dative

agricolae / agricoli:s

LEAST

accusative

agricolam / agricola:s

It is not too difficult to imagine, in light of Diver’s “human factor”
(Diver, 1975/2012, pp. 53-56 et passim) how intelligent human beings
manage to distinguish one agricolae from the other: In a given
context, it will often be true that one knows whether one is dealing
with one farmer or more, or whether one is dealing with a man
(nominative) who, say, is selling corn, or with someone lower down on
the scale of responsibility, such as a man (dative) who is sold corn.
This must pretty much be the way modern Spanish speakers decide
whether an instance of, say, canto is ‘song’ or ‘I sing’: by an intelligent
use of context.
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The postulation of homonymy in cases such as agricolae is
fairly straightforward. A more interesting positing of homonymy in
Diver’s grammar is represented by agricoli:s in Diagram 3. Diver
would have two signals agricoli:s. These are signals of the two distinct
meanings MORE and LESS Degrees of Control “exercised by a participant
over some activity, usually that indicated by the verb” (p. 215). But
here, the two putative signals are adjacent on the scale. Moreover, the
ablative plural and the dative plural are always—without
exception!—phonologically identical. One might well wonder how
language-users manage to distinguish the two signals and thus the
two meanings. Obviously, it was the structure of the Control-Number
interlock that guided Diver’s decision to posit two signals here. Diver
(1995/2012, p. 493) justified the decision regarding Latin ablative
and dative plural the same way he did “the loss of a singular-plural
distinction [in modern English you] which was maintained elsewhere
in the system”: “the distinction made, precisely, in the system as a
whole [i.e., I/we; me/us; he, she, it / they; him, her, it / them] is used as
a reference point for setting up the possibilities from among which to
choose where the signalling is imprecise [i.e., you].”
Evidently, in the phrase “as a reference point for setting up the
possibilities,” Diver was not referring (just) to the analyst but to the
language-user:
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For the reader of the Latin text, the imprecise plural case form
[e.g., agricoli:s] provides only the information that the word is
to be regarded as not nominative, not accusative, not genitive,
and what is left in doubt is only the distinction between dative
and ablative. The reader, knowing [thanks to the singular,
presumably; jd] the ways in which the dative and the ablative
are used, can then decide which of the two is the more
appropriate to infer. The need for the application of an
intelligent appraisal is evident. (Diver, 1995/2012, p. 493)

Regardless of one’s confidence in Diver’s speculation about the
psychological processes of the (proficient) reader of Latin, it is clear
that the analyst, in setting up two signals for ablative plural and dative
plural, is being guided by structure that is posited elsewhere and
deemed to be relevant.
The thinking brings to mind the conception of linguistic
structure traceable to Saussure (if through Meillet): a system — un
tout en soi (Saussure, 1916/1972, p. 25) — in which tout se tient ‘the
whole thing hangs together.’ One part of the grammar is related to
every other part of the grammar.
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2.1.2.3. Diver’s residual member. That interrelatedness of grammatical
elements is particularly striking in what Diver (1978/2012, p. 125 et
passim) called the residual member of a grammatical system, one
whose “semantic substance is defined entirely by its opposition to the
other members.” A somewhat trivial illustration of a residual
member, seen already, is the English signal –s of the meaning OTHER
THAN ONE in the system of Number (e.g., cat-s).

A perhaps better

illustration that the residual member means essentially NONE OF THE
ABOVE would be Diver’s (1978/2012, p. 122) hypothesis for the

meaning of the Greek genitive case in his system of Relation to a Place,
Diagram 4:

Diagram 4: Diver’s system of Relation to a Place in Greek
meanings

signals

AT A SPECIFIED PLACE

dative

WELL-ORDERED WITH RESPECT TO A SPECIFIED PLACE

accusative

OTHER PLACE RELATIONS

genitive

Basically, the Greek dative, says Diver, is used for a point-like location,
the accusative for neat relations such as lines and circles, and the
genitive for messier place relations such as the missing of a target or
the meandering of a vine around a cave. The meaning of the genitive,
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then, is essentially NOT one of the other meanings of the system. In the
Greek Place system, the genitive is a null kind of thing, in a way: an
absence of something more structurally well-defined.

2.1.2.4. Diver’s opposition of inclusion. Another variation on these
system-internal relations is represented by Diver’s opposition of
inclusion. To understand this kind of structural relationship, it is
necessary first to understand those seen, for instance, in Diagrams 3
and 4 as oppositions of exclusion: each meaning of the system excludes
all the other members of the system. Such oppositions of exclusion,
where one value excludes all the other values, are the norm in Diver.
Oppositions of inclusion are far less common. One is represented by
the system of Number in Greek (Diver, 1987/2012). To make the
point, Diagram 5 contrasts the Number system of Greek — with its
opposition of inclusion — with those of Latin and Sanskrit — which
have only the more routine oppositions of exclusion.

Diagram 5. Three systems of Number
Latin

Sanskrit

ONE

ONE

Greek
ONE

TWO
OTHER

OTHER

TWO
OTHER
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Latin has the familiar set-up: a signal (the singular) for the meaning
ONE and a signal (the plural) for everything else.

That is like English or

Spanish. Sanskrit has something a bit more unusual but still just
straightforward oppositions of exclusion: a signal (the singular) for
the meaning ONE, a signal (the dual) for the meaning TWO, and a signal
(the “plural”) for everything else, such as three, four, or seventy. But
Greek has an opposition of inclusion. Greek has a dedicated signal
(the singular) for the meaning ONE and a dedicated signal (the dual)
for the meaning TWO, but its signal for numbers such as three, four,
and seventy (its “plural”), can be used too when there are only two of
something. The Greek meaning OTHER includes the meaning TWO.
(This is indicated by the curly bracket.) Diver was fascinated by how
the Greek writer, Homer, employed this Number system in accordance
with an apparent interest in being precise or not, using the included
signal of the meaning TWO for things that were of special interest to
him and the including member, the meaning OTHER, for things that
were of less interest to him. The point for us, however, is merely that,
here again, an element of structure—a precise Number meaning—can
be dispensed with. Put another way, a certain element of linguistic
structure—the meaning TWO—remains relevant even when it is not
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signaled, even when the poet opts out of signaling that precise
number.
All the structural relations seen so far might be called
oppositions of value. In them, a given semantic substance — e.g.,
Number or Relation to a Place — is exhaustively divided up, by
signals, into relative values. One value is defined by its opposition to
the others, that is, by being not another value in the same semantic
substance. We have seen four types of hypotheses in Diver where an
element of structure may, at a certain point in the text, be relevantly
not present: the null signal, homonymy, the residual member in a
system, and the including member in a system.

2.1.3. The opposition of substance
Another type of structural relation illustrates too, in its own way, the
relevance of an absence of structure at a certain point in the text. This
is the opposition of substance. As defined by Davis (1992, p. 287,
summarized in Davis, 1995), an opposition of substance is “a
relationship in which two signals have certain meanings in common
but differ in that one signal entirely lacks meanings from some
semantic substance to which the other signal belongs.”vi This
structural relation was defined in order to account for the distribution
in texts of two pronouns in modern literary Italian, egli and lui, both
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often glossed ‘he.’ The meanings that egli and lui have in common —
and so establish a basis upon which the two pronouns can be related
— are: Number ONE, Sex MALE, Referent OTHER THAN SPEAKER OR HEARER
(i.e., third person), and Attention LOW (as opposed to more highly
demonstrative forms). Where they differ — their opposition of
substance — is in that egli, but not lui, also signals a meaning from an
additional substance: the meaning CENTRAL in a system of Focus on
participants in events. Essentially, egli is restricted to being the
subject (not the oblique) of a particular verb, while lui is much more
of a free-floater. Consequently, the relevance of egli is tied to a
particular event in the narrative, while lui may conceptually relate to
something in addition to — or even instead of — an event in the
narrative. For instance, lui may suggest a contrast between one man
(lui) doing one thing and another man mentioned elsewhere in the
context. Such a token of lui would be relevant both to its own verb
and to some noun somewhere else in the context.
As can be imagined, the contrast between egli and lui is subtle
and requires careful validation. Other oppositions of substance,
however, are more readily obvious (given knowledge of the
morphology). Davis (2002) analyzes the three Italian third-person
disjunctive pronouns ess+ (where ‘+’ indicates a slot for a gender and
number suffix –a, -o, -e, -i), loro, and sé in terms of oppositions of
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substance. So essi ‘they / them’ is explicitly plural in number and
masculine in gender. Loro ‘they / them / each other’ is explicitly
plural in number but indifferent to grammatical gender. And sé
‘themselves / himself / herself / itself’ is indifferent to both number
and gender. The three forms thus illustrate a one-step-at-a-time
reduction in the relative semantic weights that they bear. Ess+
provides the most information: person, number, and gender. Loro
provides just person and number. And sé signals only person. The
analysis shows how these oppositions of substance account for the
observed distributions of the three forms in texts, including examples
traditionally classed, respectively, as demonstrative, reciprocal, and
reflexive: ‘they talk in the midst of them ( fra essi)’; ‘they talk among
themselves ( fra loro)’; ‘they talk to themselves ( fra sé).’ The
distribution of loro is accounted for by a language-user’s opting out of
the substance that corresponds to grammatical gender. The
distribution of sé is accounted for by an opting out of substances
having to do with number and grammatical gender. The relevance of
that analysis to the present thesis is, again, that the systematic
absence of a certain element of structure can be relevant in accounting
for the observed presence of a form at a certain point in a text.
The idea of the opposition of substance is carried out more
fully in Davis (2017b).vii There, the Italian clitic si, traditionally
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classed as the impersonal and reflexive pronoun of the third person
(‘one,’ ‘himself / herself / itself / themselves’), is analyzed in terms of
oppositions of substance. Most of the other clitics (datives gli/le/loro,
accusatives lo/la/li/le, plus the freestanding egli) signal meanings
from systems of Number, grammatical gender or Sex, and a system
called Degree of Control (traditionally, case), which (as above, for
Diver) has to do with a participant’s level of responsibility for an
event. Si, by contrast, represents an opting out of all of those
substances. The presence of si at a certain point in the text is a result
of a writer’s avoidance of those semantic substances. Sometimes they
are irrelevant, sometimes they are superfluous, and sometimes they
are too categorical and so get “neutralized” by si. Si signals very little:
just that some third person is participating somehow in an event. Just
who and just how, is left to inference. Crucial to the thesis here: The
distribution of si can be accounted for only by an analytical appeal to
those very semantic substances in the network of systems of which si
is a part, which are not signaled by si. Si is present at a point in a text
because of what si is not. Si is a mere specter of a pronoun, hardly a
substantial pronoun at all—if one believes in pronouns.
The oppositions of substance that are posited for si account not
only for individual tokens of si but also for statistical patterns across
large stretches of text. For instance, in an authentic text, a chapter
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about people “Becoming Part of the Roman World” contains more
tokens of signals of Degree of Control relative to si, while a chapter
about “Italic Alphabets and Dialects” contains fewer tokens of signals
of Degree of Control relative to si.viii This observed difference can be
attributed to the human factor: People are typically held, by languageusers, to bear considerable responsibility for events, while alphabets
and dialects have no will of their own. See Table 1.

Table 1. Si- and the Neutralization of Control*
Ch. VI

Ch. XI

‘Italic Alphabets ‘Becoming Part of
and Dialects’ the Roman World’
si (no Control meaning)
l+ (a Control meaning)

122

196

9

35

Ratio 14:1

Ratio 6:1
OR > 2.4

*Source of data: Giacomo Devoto. 1951. Gli antichi italici. 2nd
edition. Firenze: Vallecchi.

In this text, the odds of observing si, as opposed to l+, in a chapter (VI)
devoted to alphabets and dialects is over twice as high as the odds of
observing si in a chapter (XI) devoted to people. Thus, an element of
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linguistic structure that is present here and absent there in a text has
very real, measurable effects on the structure of discourse. Or, at
least, the opposition of substance provides an account of such
correlations in discourse.
The opposition of substance is one more development in a
series of linguistic treatments that point to the relevance of the
insubstantial in observable phenomena.

3. Unsignaled structure in music

Much as the relevance of the opposition of substance finds support in
language, so too the relevance of unsignaled structure finds support in
semiotics outside of language: in music. This extra-linguistic support
is relevant if, as indicated in the introduction to this paper, the facts of
linguistic structure resemble importantly, through and through,
aspects of other types of human behavior.
Consider modern western musical notation. Analogize a
linguistic element (e.g., si) to a certain triad of notes (e.g., GBD) in a
musical score; analogize a phrase in a piece of discourse to a musical
phrase; and analogize a language-user’s grammar (a system of
systems) to a whole musical composition. The eighteenth-to-
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nineteenth-century convention in music was to indicate the key
signature of an entire composition just once, at the very beginning of
the piece; it is assumed then that that key signature prevails until it is
explicitly changed.ix As a result, accidentals — sharps and flats — do
not need to be indicated for each note of the perhaps several pages of
a western classical or romantic musical composition, but only once.
Wherever the accidentals are not explicitly indicated, they are,
actually, missing structures. In terms of performance, this principle of
organization entails that a pianist’s fingers, for example, will alight on
a black or a white key in response to structure that is not signaled at
that point in the musical text, perhaps not even on that page of text.
For instance, consider the triad in Diagram 6:

Diagram 6. Opposition of substance in musical notation

@@ Insert file Gchord here

Three notes — making one chord — are indicated, but exactly what
those three notes are depends on the key signature that was
established at the very beginning of the composition. There are six
different combinations of actual notes potentially played — the
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observations that a viewer-listener would make — depending on the
overall key of the composition. See Table 2:

Table 2. Musical triads instantiating multiple compositional keys
notes played

key of the composition

•

G–B–D

C maj., a min., G maj., e min., D maj., b min.

•

G#-B – D

A maj., f# min.

•

G#-B – D#

E maj., c# min., B maj., g# min., F# maj., d# min.

•

G – Bb- D

F maj., d min., Bb maj., g min., Eb maj., c min.

•

G - Bb- Db

Ab maj., f min.

•

Gb- Bb- Db

Db maj., bb min., Gb maj., eb min.

For the benefit of those who know only that a piano has black keys
and white keys: The number of those colors played might be 0, 1, 2, or
3, depending. Now of course a proficient pianist playing a Chopin
étude typically will not pause to calculate all this, but the performance
— the observable distribution of the movement of the fingers, to put it
crudely — gives evidence of his or her implicit knowledge of the
semiotic system.
Human beings are capable of operating systematically even
when relevant structure is not explicitly signaled.
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4. When there’s no there there

In all the linguistic situations surveyed thus far, a posited structure
provides a framework within which to posit a theoretically significant
absence: homonymy, the null morpheme, the residual member or the
including member in an opposition of value, and the opposition of
substance. For Chomsky and his followers, that framework is
sentence structure; for Diver and his followers, that framework is a
grammatical system (e.g., Number, Degree of Control, Focus, Relation
to a Place) and the interlocks into which that system enters with other
grammatical systems. This structural framework serves as a kind of
analytical control over what gets posited; no linguist would posit a
million zeroes all over the place.
That granted, however, it might be worth asking: Can anything
interesting be said about situations when a structural element is
present versus when it is absent, when it is simply not there, when
nothing is simply nothing? This is the question that Contini-Morava
(2006) skirts but rightly avoids. Her chosen problem is, How can we
tell a significant null from just nothing? Her chosen problem is not,
What can we say when there is simply nothing? To address that
question would require that we sacrifice the tight analytical control of
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a posited structural framework. The fear of that analytical precipice
can be expressed with the truism that, throughout a body of discourse,
there is an infinite number of absences of whatever structural element
one might choose to study (for instance, the absence of whom in this
paper).
Still, it might be possible to gain some understanding of what is
accomplished by interjecting a structural element at a certain point in
discourse as opposed to leaving it out at that point altogether. To
make the task as manageable as possible, we would need to hold
constant some element in the context. Then we could at least get a
sense of what effect is achieved by a language-user’s introducing our
hypothesized semantic substance versus not introducing it at that
point in the discourse.x
Again, an extra-linguistic analogy is not hard to identify. For
instance, a serious anthropologist might wish to study presence
versus absence of open umbrella. Clearly, the anthropologist would
want to hold certain variables constant; for instance, there might be
no reason to study open umbrellas (or their absence) in the hands of
persons lying in bed, nor open umbrellas carried (or not) by dogs, nor
open umbrellas on cloudless days, nor open umbrellas on Antarctica.
One could hold variables constant by limiting the study to, say, human
pedestrians during rainfall. One could limit the geographical range of
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the study to, say, Northampton County, North Carolina; the borough of
Manhattan, New York; and the city of Venice, Italy. Conducting such a
study might reveal genuinely interesting facts about issues such as:
sartorial fashion across generations, gender stereotypes across
cultures, the attitudes towards rain among participants in agricultural
versus urban cultures, and the design of thoroughfares across
jurisdictions.xi
It is indeed feasible to study the presence versus the absence of
a thing.
To conduct that as a study in Columbia School linguistics, one
would have to ask: Under what circumstances is a given semantic
substance not signaled at all?

4.1. Absence studied from a Columbia School linguistic perspective

Consider the distribution in modern literary Italian of vi and ci,
adverbial clitics to the verb, both typically glossed ‘there’ and
sometimes incorrectly viewed as “fully synonymous” (Russi, 2008, p.
57). Based on a survey of their distribution relative to each other, one
might hypothesize that they are signals with relative values in a
system of Restrictedness of Space, with vi signaling the meaning
RESTRICTED and ci signaling the meaning UNRESTRICTED (Davis, 2017a).
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Such a survey would include examples that are locative in a
straightforward way, such as vi si annida ‘is hiding out there (in
Rome)’ versus non ci torno ‘I’m not going back there (abroad)’ (Silone,
Pane e vino). But the survey would also include examples that the
tradition classifies as existential, where the communicative effect is,
putatively, merely to assert existence, as in Examples (1) (Rigoni
Stern) and (2) (Calvino), below.

(1)

vi

sono due pecore e

un maiale

there are two sheep and a pig
‘there are two sheep and a pig’

(2)

C’

era una farfalla morta

there was a

dead

butterfly

‘There was a dead butterfly’

Examination of the actual contexts of those examples reveals that, in
(1), the sheep and the pig are conveniently confined in a stall where
they can easily be slaughtered by hungry soldiers far from home, and
that, in (2), the dead butterfly is found on the threshold of a house,
one of several signs left here and there around the countryside by an
evil viscount as omens of his ill intent towards his people. Thus the
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precise space in which the sheep and pig exist is relevant: vi =
RESTRICTED, while the precise space where the dead butterfly happens

to be found is happenstance: ci = UNRESTRICTED. What the grammar of
Italian needs to say, then, is not merely that certain examples are
existential, but that sometimes the existence of something is asserted
in a RESTRICTED Space and sometimes the existence of something is
asserted in an UNRESTRICTED Space.
This understanding lays the groundwork for a survey of
examples asserting the existence of something, some with vi or ci, and
some with neither; that is, some signaling Restrictedness of Space, and
some not: some examples with a grammatical something, and some
examples with grammatically nothing, some with presence and some
with absence. To make the survey manageable, one could limit it to
examples with forms of the copula. Among such examples, one would
find example (3) (Silone):

(3)

sulla groppa dell’ asino

è allungato

on-the rump of-the donkey is stretched-out
‘on the donkey’s rump is stretched out
il

cadavere d’un lupo

the body

of a wolf

the body of a wolf’
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Examination of the context reveals that, in (3), a dead wolf is being
displayed to a gaggle of villagers. One of them has shot the wolf and
has brought it to show to them, in order to warn them of the existence
of danger in the region. The point here is indeed simply that the wolf
exists; there is no communicative need to restrict to a greater (vi) or
lesser (ci) degree the space in which the wolf exists. This example,
therefore, contains no signal of Restrictedness of Space. In the words
of Gertrude Stein, “There is no there there.”
If we in linguistics ever manage to develop a good understanding of structural absence — homonymy, the null morpheme, the
residual member or the including member in an opposition of value,
the opposition of substance — then we will be in a better position to
understand the absence of structure. That is, understanding when
nothing is something would help us to understand when nothing is
simply nothing.

4.2. Absence studied in variationist linguistics

An essentially comparable approach is taken by Otheguy & Zentella
(2012) in their full-length study of the presence versus the absence of
subject pronouns in Spanish in New York City. Variationist linguistics
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concerns primarily the differences in output among individuals and
groups of individuals. Now different individuals may have different
mental grammars, especially if they are identified with different social
groups (such as countries of origin). Then, the question of presence
versus absence of an element is worth asking only if both individuals
possess the element in question and also exhibit the possibility of its
absence. For instance, both a Spanish speaker from Mexico and a
Spanish speaker from Cuba might exhibit both Él come and Come ‘He
eats,’ and a variationist might well study how the two speakers
compare in terms of presence versus absence of él. The variationist
might investigate whether, in general, speakers from Mexico and
speakers from Cuba differ in regard to presence versus absence of él,
and if so then how so. By contrast, it would hardly be worthwhile to
study the presence versus the absence of the partitive clitic ne in the
output of an Italian speaker from Italy compared to that of a Spanish
speaker from Cuba; only the former would exhibit this ne at all.
To make their work analytically feasible — that is, so that they
can manageably compare presence and absence of pronoun — what
Otheguy & Zentella (2012, p. 48) hold constant — the way they define
their “envelope of variation” — is the presence of a bare finite verb
with an “ascertainable” animate subject.xii If they did not do this, they
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could claim that there are absences of overt pronoun all over the
place.
It is worth considering why the problem of Él come and Come
in the output of the Spanish speaker from Mexico and the Spanish
speaker from Cuba is a problem of presence versus absence rather
than a problem of él versus null. While there are certainly empirical
reasons related to their study for this decision, Otheguy & Zentella
(2012, p. 9) give a theoretical rationale as well: “The notion of a null
pronoun reflects a conceptualization that is integral” in one’s
theoretical framework. “The postulation of nulls . . . is required by
certain analytical claims that would otherwise be difficult to support”
(cf. supra).xiii This is the question of whether we have to do across the
board — in both presence and absence — with structure or not. In
the review of linguistics traced so far in this paper, a phonetic null was
posited by Harris, by Chomsky, and by Diver as a structural element in
its own right, the occupier of a slot in a morphological paradigm, in a
sentence, or in a grammatical system comprised of meaningful signals.
The opposition of substance too has to do essentially with structure:
the systematic opposition between an element that bears a meaning
from some semantic structure (e.g., Italian l+ above, bearing a
meaning of Degree of Control) and another element that does not (si).
By contrast, at this point in this paper, the question is, instead, how to
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treat the overt presence of a structural element versus the mere
absence of that element, when the absence of that element is not itself
a structural element. There’s simply nothing there, much as when one
compares an utterance like This is a really muggy night versus This is a
muggy night. So, it might be argued, the theoretical reason why
Otheguy & Zentella (2012) treat utterances such as Come as the
absence of él rather than as the presence of a null subject is because
they are analyzing not sentence structure but attested speech.
Without the assumption of the framework of sentence structure, the
utterance Come is just the utterance Come, and it contains no él.xiv
Adopting this positon of presence versus absence, Otheguy &
Zentella (2012) do discover interesting facts about Spanish as spoken
in New York by members of various social groups. The facts of
variation result from differential motivations by the members of the
groups to insert into discourse the functional content that a certain
pronoun (e.g., él) contributes. That insight is possible only if the
question is framed in terms of presence versus absence. If “null
subject” had its own value — either different from or the same as
“overt subject” — then that value — a positive thing — would be
competing, as it were, with the value of “overt subject,” much as the
value of, say él ‘he’ competes with the value of ella ‘she’ or with the
value of ellos ‘they.’
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In linguistics, absence is not necessarily the same thing as null.
(As, in mathematics, empty set is not the same thing as the real
number zero.)

5. Conclusion

In linguistics, it can be worthwhile to truck in nothingness. That has
been shown to be true in structural linguistics, in formal linguistics, in
Columbia School linguistics, and in variationist linguistics and in
grammaticalization. Moreover, as Diver (1995/2012, pp. 446-447)
would have it, language is in some respects like other aspects of
intelligent human behavior. So nothingness, if it is important outside
linguistics (in mathematics, in sport, and so forth), may be important
in linguistics too.
It is a well-known trait of human beings to seek out pattern
and even to impute significance where there is none: seeing crabs and
bulls in the constellations, finding good luck in a four-leaf clover, or
believing in a divine promise on account of a rainbow. This general
trait is no doubt an extra-linguistic manifestation of Diver’s “human
factor” in linguistics. In a finite semiotic system such as grammar,
where all the parts of the system interrelate, it is human nature to
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behave in ways that are consistent with that system, even when overt
signaling of elements of the system is abandoned. The semantic side
of language does not cease to exist when the phonetic side falls silent.
If this is indeed the way human beings behave when we speak and
write, then it will be unavoidable for the linguist sometimes to
formulate hypotheses of such insubstantial realities as null signals,
homonyms, residual meanings, oppositions of inclusion, oppositions
of substance, and indeed to reckon with absence itself.
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Notes

Already García & Putte (1989) had proposed frequency of usage as
the mechanism that drives the diachronic development of an
opposition between a nothing and a something.
ii See Otheguy (2002) for a critique of the commonplace view in
linguistics that syntactic categories constitute observations.
iii On Spanish a with direct objects, see also García & Putte (1989).
iv García & Putte (1989), in proposing a mechanism for the diachronic
development of zero, had at least implicitly distinguished between
absence (or “nothing”) and zero as a signifié.
v Huffman (2001) and Huffman (2012) offer good, accessible
introductions to Diver’s thought. See Davis (2004) for one take on
Diver’s debt to Ferdinand de Saussure.
vi García (1983) had accounted for the distribution of the Spanish
disjunctive pronouns in a way that looked forward to the opposition
i
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of substance, though she did not use the term and she insisted, unlike
Davis (1992), that the forms in question had no meaning in common.
vii For another treatment of a modern reflex of Classical Latin sē in
terms of an opposition of substance, see Gorup (2006) on Serbo-Croatian
se. For earlier analyses, not posting an opposition of substance, see
García 1975, Diver 1986/2012, and Diver 1992/2012.
viii This result is reported too in Davis (2016) and in Davis (2017b).
ix This is where the analogy, like all analogies, is less than perfect. In
music, there is one conventionalized place to indicate key structure,
while in discourse, there is no particular conventionalized place to
indicate grammatical structure. Musical key structure is typically
made explicit by the composer at the beginning of the piece;
grammatical structure is typically made explicit only by the linguist,
not by the language-user — though language-users do occasionally
speak somewhat explicitly about their grammatical structure: “OK,
I’m gonna speak English now, not Spanish” or “I’ve probably never
heard egli in Italian speech, only lui.” Anyway, much as an attested
segment of a piece of music may lack any indication of still-relevant
key signature, so an attested segment of discourse (e.g., a stretch with
Italian si) may lack any indication of the still-relevant grammatical
system (e.g., Degree of Control) being opted out of.
x See also Tippets (2011). An enlightening treatment that takes a
different analytical approach is the examination in Huffman (1997:
293-315) of the system of Degree of Control signaled by the French
clitics lui and le/la/les versus prepositional phrases with à.
xi For instance, there are streets in Venice that are too narrow at some
points for pedestrians to carry open umbrellas, while that is not a
factor in Manhattan, where streets are at least forty feet wide, or in
Northampton County, where roads run extensively between peanut
fields.
xii See pp. 48-55 of their volume for a full statement of their criteria.
xiii Otheguy & Zentella (2012: 9) actually apply this statement only to
formal linguistics, but, as seen above, it in fact applies more broadly.
xiv This is not at all to dispute or dismiss their own carefully thoughtout reasons for speaking of “absence” rather than “null subject” but
rather to give my own twist to the question, in the service of the point
being made in this paper.
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